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Abstract 
Safety critical systems are evolutionary and subject to preventive, perfective, corrective or 
adaptive changes during their lifecycle. Changes to any part of those systems can undermine 
the confidence in safety since changes can refute articulated claims about safety or challenge 
the supporting evidence on which this confidence relies. Changes to the software components 
are no exception. In order to maintain the confidence in the safety performance, developers 
must update their system and its safety case. Agile methodologies are known to embrace 
changes to software where agilists strive to manage changes, not to prevent them. In this 
paper, we introduce a novel framework in which we tailor a hybrid process of agile software 
development and the traditional V-model. The tailored process aims to facilitate the 
accommodation of non-structural changes to the software parts of safety critical systems. We 
illustrate our framework in the context of ISO 26262 safety standard. 
Introduction 
Many safety critical systems are subject to compulsory or advisory certification process which 
often necessitates building the systems in compliance with domain-specific safety standards 
(Jaradat & Bate, 2017). Safety standards are becoming the main guide of the development and 
maintenance of hardware and software parts of safety critical systems. Safety standards, also, 
form the basis for the approval and certification of those systems (Denney et al., 2015). 
Software systems, in general, are subject to different types of changes (e.g., preventive, 
perfective, corrective or adaptive) during the different stages in their life-cycle. In order to 
maintain the confidence in safety after accommodating a change, developers are required to 
update the safety case, which in turn requires identifying, re-analysing, and re-checking the 
impacted parts of the system and generate a new valid set of evidence (Jaradat & Bate, 2017). 
Despite the obvious recommendations to adequately maintain and review the systems and their 
safety cases by different safety standards, the latter offer little or no advice on how such 
operations can be carried out (T. Kelly & J. McDermid, 1999). There is an increasing need for 
globally-accepted methods and techniques to enable easier change accommodation in safety 
critical systems without incurring disproportionate cost compared to the size of the change. 
However, since broader re-verification and re-validation require more effort and time, it is 
important for any proposal aims to facilitate system changes to delimit the impact of changes. 
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 Safety standards in many safety critical system domains adopt the traditional V-model as a 
development process for building the systems. Despite the effectiveness of validation and 
verification that the V-model provides, in addition to other advantages (e.g., easy to estimate 
costs, create timeliness, and stick to deadlines), the model has a well-known drawback when it 
comes to handling system changes. This is particularly true when it comes to changes to 
software systems and their requirements. Following the V-model implies that changes to 
software components requires re-visiting the system requirements and all later stages to 
perform a broad and costly impact analysis process. Hence, accepting software changes while 
using a V-model based process is not a trivial task. 
Unlike the series of isolated phases in the V-model, agile methods depend on iterative and 
incremental development of software to enable reduction in cost, acceleration of time to 
market in addition to the focus of providing more maintainable code (Salameh, 2011; Tarwani 
& Chug, 2016). Software developers who follow agile methods breakdown their project into 
manageable fragments which enables a rapid responsive ways to handle software changes. The 
Agile way of working minimises the shortcomings of traditional sequential methods and 
improves the software development process in a more cost-efficient way (Tarwani & Chug, 
2016). The alignment of the development process with a dynamic environment is a critical 
motivation for adopting Agile Software Development (ASD) (Cao et al., 2010). Test Driven 
Development (TDD) is an important agile process that brings many benefits such as reducing 
the potential consequences of software defects. TDD protects the system from future failures 
proactively, which leads to an acceleration of the maintenance process (Knippers, 2011). 
The work in this paper does not seek to conduct a comparative study between agile methods 
and the V-model. The main contribution of this paper, however, is to propose XP-Kan-Safe as 
a novel maintenance framework to facilitate the accommodation process of software non-
structural changes in safety critical systems by utilising the strengths of agile methods and the 
V-model. More clearly, we reconcile the known effective validation & verification process of 
the V-model to the known effective practices and the TDD process of agile methods. We 
exploit the usage of safety contracts (Bate et al., 2003) as: 1) stitches that connect the V-
model, Extreme Programming (XP) and Kanban into our tailored process, and 2) means to 
enable a tri-directional impact analysis process. The hypothesis we make is that ASD can 
resolve some observed maintenance challenges in the V-model while maintaining software 
parts of systems. 
Background and Motivation 
Safety Cases and Safety Arguments 
A safety case (also known as assurance or safety assurance case) is: “A structured argument, 
supported by a body of evidence that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case 
that a system is safe for a given application in a given operating environment" (00-56 Standard, 
2015). A safety case shall comprise both safety evidence (e.g., safety analyses, software 
inspections, or functional tests) and a safety argument explaining that evidence (Jaradat et al., 
2014). Safety cases might contain an implicit safety argument but some safety standards 
require an explicit argument that is usually expressed in terms of a defined hierarchy of safety 
claims and sub-claims that are supported by a body of evidence (00-56 Standard, 2015). There 
are several ways to represent safety arguments (e.g., textual, tabular, graphical, etc.). In this 
paper, we use the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) (GSN Standard, 2011), which provides a 
graphical means of communicating (1) safety argument elements, claims (goals), argument 
logic (strategies), assumptions, context, evidence (solutions), and (2) the relationships between 
these elements (Jaradat et al., 2015a). Figure 1 shows the main notations of the GSN. 
 
Figure 1— Notation Keys of the GSN 
 
Maintenance of Safety Critical Systems and Their Safety Cases 
Change requests should be assessed before decision makers decide whether or not to accept 
them. The assessment should reveal if the change can cause unreasonable risks, and the 
required cost to implement the change. Hence, system developers should understand the 
change and the potential risks that it might carry before they identify the impacted parts. 
Misunderstanding the change might lead to skip those parts of the system which are dependent 
on that assumptions. Also, the developers need to understand the dependencies between the 
system parts to identify the affected parts correctly. For example, the effect of a change can 
propagate to other parts of the system — creating a ripple effect — and cause unforeseen 
violations of the acceptable safety limits. If the impact of change is not clear, developers might 
be conservative and do wider analyses and verification (i.e., check more elements than strictly 
necessary), and this will exacerbate the cost problem of safety cases. It is also necessary for 
the developers to describe how the change affects the system parts in order to correctly 
estimate the cost of the response to that change. Otherwise, the response to a change might 
generate unplanned further changes to which the system must again respond, and this requires 
more cost than originally estimated. 
ISO 26262 Safety Standard 
ISO 26262 (ISO 26262:2011, 2011) regulates the automotive domain and it is intended to be 
applied to safety-related systems that include one or more electrical and/or electronic systems. 
The following parts are summarised descriptions of the safety requirements decomposition 
directly from ISO 26262 guidelines: 
1. After identifying hazards, the standard recommends to formulate Safety Goals (SGs) to 
eliminate or mitigate hazards. The standard defines a safety goal as a top-level safety 
requirement resultant of the hazard analysis and risk assessment. Safety goals are not 
expressed in terms of technological solutions, but in terms of functional objectives. 
2. Identification of SGs leads to the functional safety concept. The objective of the functional 
safety concept is to derive the Functional Safety Requirements (FSRs) from the SGs, and 
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to allocate them to the preliminary architectural elements. At least one FSR shall be 
specified for each SG. Derivation of FSRs can be supported by safety analyses (e.g., 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis, Hazard and Operability 
Study (HAZOP)) in order to develop a complete set of effective functional safety 
requirements. 
3. The functional concept leads to the technical safety concept. The first objective of the 
latter is to specify the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs) and their allocation to 
system elements. The second objective is to verify that the TSRs comply with the 
functional safety requirements. TSRs are used to derive Software Safety Requirements 
(SSRs). 
Safety Contracts 
Contract-based design (Benvenuti et al., 2008) is defined as an approach in which the design 
process is seen as a successive assembly of components where a component behaviour is 
represented in terms of assumptions about its environment and guarantees about its behaviour. 
Hence, contracts are intended to describe functional and behavioural properties for each 
design component in form of assumptions and guarantees. A contract is said to be a safety 
contract if it guarantees a property that is traceable to a hazard. Using contracts in 
development of safety critical systems is not a novel idea since there are many works utilise 
contracts for building, reusing or maintaining safety critical systems (e.g., (Bate et al., 2003; 
Jaradat et al., 2015a; Jaradat et al., 2015b)). The cost of maintaining, reusing and changing 
software components is lessened while using contracts as developers may rework software 
components with knowledge of the constraints placed upon them (Bates et al., 2003). In this 
paper, we use contracts to support the maintainability of safety critical systems. We also 
suggest to include additional information into safety contracts in order to enable effective 
traceability. 
Agile Software Development (ASD) 
Compared to traditional software engineering approaches, ASD targets complex systems and 
product development with dynamic, non-deterministic and non-linear characteristics. ASD 
methods (e.g., XP, Kanban, Scrum) evolve through collaboration between self-organising and 
cross-functional teams by sharing the same philosophy and utilising the appropriate practices 
for their contexts. 
Each agile method has its own set of features (e.g., practices, terminologies, and tactics) and 
those features should reflect ASD values and principles. However, agile methods vary when it 
comes to the strategies they adopt to reflect those values and principles. For example, Kanban 
is known to have a rapid response to software requirement changes since it allows the team to 
instantly postpone some change requests to start with other emergent requests. Scrum might 
do the same but not after the completion of a sprint planning meeting and team commitment. 
XP teams are amenable to change within their iterations as long as a team has not started work 
on a particular feature that needs to be exchanged with the new feature. There is no standard 
recommendation as to how an agile method should implement its features (Campanelli & 
Parreiras, 2015). 
Organisations, typically, adapt software development methodologies to be in line with their 
needs and contexts, which covering the full spectrum of the software development life-cycle 
(Heeager & Rose, 2015; Salameh, 2011). In fact, there is no single agile method that can be 
adopted for any arbitrary context or to efficiently cover all phases in the development life-
cycle. Hence, organisations might not adopt an entire agile method, but rather they combine 
different processes from different agile methods based on their needs and contexts. 
Agile Tailoring 
The process in which an agile method is adapted for a specific project situation in a responsive 
way to accommodate the encountered challenges and to cover the indented interplay between 
contexts in a dynamic way, is called Agile Tailoring. There are two main approaches to tailor 
agile methods: the contingency factors and the method engineering theory (Campanelli & 
Parreiras, 2015). The first approach, handles the tailoring by choosing multiple methods to be 
on standby in an organisation (i.e., Crystal family (Abrahamsson et al., 2003)). The selection 
of any standby method is based on project size and criticality, as well as the development 
context, such as uncertainty level, impact and structure. The second approach is based on 
meta-method processes and proposes the creation of a new method to be applied on specific 
contexts based on existing method fragments (a fragment represents a set of practices) 
(Campanelli & Parreiras, 2015). Despite the flexibility of this approach, it introduces 
challenges such as how to control the fragments or how to assemble the method for a context 
specific situation by bringing the appropriate fragments and integrating them into one 
framework (Campanelli & Parreiras, 2015). In this paper, we tailor our framework using the 
method engineering approach. 
The Kanban Method 
Kanban is based on lean principles: it tries to remove the waste of the production process by 
embracing rules to limit Work In Progress (WIP) and measures the time to finish the tasks 
(Campanelli & Parreiras, 2015). Kanban does not prescribe a specific set of roles or process 
steps, but rather it encourages its users to start from the existing context by understanding and 
emphasising the customers’ needs (Ahmad et al., 2013). Kanban is deemed as an approach to 
process change for organisations by providing sufficient visibility and understanding of the 
workflow and its progress. Kanban is all about visual signs (aka Kanban Cards) which 
represent individual work items accompanied with their critical information. Those cards 
move across a board (aka Kanban board). The latter is partitioned by vertical lanes which are 
titled, typically, according to the names of the development life-cycle phases (e.g., Analysis, 
Development, testing). These lanes can be partitioned further to specify the current state of 
each phase (To Do, Doing and Done). The location of a card on the board indicates the 
progress of the work and its current state. Kanban shows the assigned work for each team 
member, communicates priorities and highlights bottlenecks via cycle or lead time and the 
cumulative flow diagram (Ahmad et al., 2013; Campanelli & Parreiras, 2015). 
The XP Method 
The XP method intends to improve software quality and responsiveness to the changing 
customer requirements. XP is considered a lightweight agile method that focuses on cost 
savings, unit tests before and along code activities, frequent full system integration and 
frequent releases (Campanelli & Parreiras, 2015). XP comprises five phases: exploration, 
planning, iterations to release, productionising, maintenance and death (Salameh, 2011). The 
exploration, planning and iterations to release are the only phases involved in our tailored 
framework. 
During the exploration phase, the customers describe the features they wish to have in the first 
release of their system by writing each of them into a story card (Abrahamsson et al.,  2017). 
Our tailored framework is designed to deal with changes to a system that has been already 
built by the V-model. Hence, the features are considered as changes to the software system in 
our case. More clearly, safety engineers (who represent the customers) write change requests 
into story cards and discuss them with the team manager. During the planning phase, the story 
cards should be prioritised, an agreement on the first small release should be made and the 
time span required to implement the story cards should be estimated (Abrahamsson et al., 
2017). In the iteration and release planning phase, each release should be incremented by 
exactly one iteration. The development team should break down requested features (i.e., 
requested changes in our case) into several small releases. The customer selects the stories that 
should be implemented in a specific iteration. XP Planning Game is a close interaction 
between the customer and the development team. The latter should estimate the effort needed 
to implement the stories. 
A Maintenance Framework to Facilitate Change Management 
In this section, we build upon the background section to propose a new framework which aims 
to streamline the change management process of non-structural software changes in safety 
critical systems. The framework is referred to as XP-Kan-Safe and it comprises two main 
processes: The Preliminary Process and the Change Management process. Figure 2 provides a 
conceptual model of the framework. The conceptual model encompasses three phases: 1) 
Analysis phase to cover the derivation of safety contracts, 2) Planning phase to cover the game 
planning, and 3) Implementation phase to cover the TDD and other XP practices. The grey 
background of the model represents the Kanban board. 
The Preliminary Process 
This process is preparatory and should be performed before handling changes. The main 
objective of this process is to derive safety contracts and enrich them with additional 
information to increase the traceability between the requirements (i.e., guarantees) and 
different related artefacts. The activity of deriving safety contracts should start from the safety 
analysis phase. Safety analysis, how- ever, is typically performed on different levels such as 
system, subsystems and components levels. The preliminary process enables system 
developers to derive contracts from safety analyses on the highest level down to lower levels. 
The preliminary process is applicable to any approach aims to decompose and specify safety 
requirements. The work in this paper, however, is designed to comply with ISO 26262 thus the 
derivation of safety contracts starts from the safety analysis through which SGs are derived. 
After completing the safety analysis on the system level, safety contracts should be derived to 
guarantee the resultant SGs. A safety contract that guarantees a SG is referred to as “SG 
contract". The assumptions of a SG contract should capture the FSRs that fulfil the guaranteed 
SG. Furthermore, a contract should be derived to guarantee every assumed FSR in SG 
contracts after completing the safety analysis on the safety function level. A safety contract 
that guarantees a FSR is referred to as “FSR contract". The assumptions of a FSR contract 
should capture the TSRs that implement the guaranteed FSR. Finally, a contract should be 
derived to guarantee every assumed TSR in FSR contracts; such contracts are referred to as 
“TSR contracts". The assumptions of a TSR contract should capture the SSRs that implement 
the guaranteed TSR after completing the safety analysis on the software components level. 
 
Figure 2— A conceptual model of XP-Kan-Safe framework 
 
Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) is recommended by many safety standards 
(including ISO 26262) as a safety analysis tool to identify potential failures modes. We enable 
the derivation of safety contracts from FMEAs by adding an extra column to the FMEA table so 
that safety analysts, together with requirement engineers, should cite their derived contracts in 
it. FMEA might have a deficiency when it comes to a multiple failures investigation. Hence, 
safety analysts might use different tools, such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) to search for the 
effects of multiple failures. Our preliminary process takes this into account and manages the 
derivation of safety contracts from FMEAs and FTAs. Figure 3 shows the connection between 
FTA and FMEA in addition to an example of a derived safety contract. 
A guarantee in a contract and its related assumptions are the main elements of the contracts 
and they help to understand the relationships and the dependencies among the safety 
requirements. However, they might not be enough for analysts to identify the impacted 
artefacts and the elements in the GSN safety argument due to changes because they do not 
provide information as how the different parts are related to each other. For instance, 
identifying an impacted TSR will not directly lead to the impacted test cases and the items of 
evidence which need to be replaced. In order to enhance the traceability between the 
System Test
SW 
Components 
Integration Test
Unit Test
Implement (TDD)
Technical Safety 
Requirements 
Contracts
Functional 
Safety 
Contracts
 Technical
Safety 
Requirements
Functional 
Safety 
Requirements
Function
Safety 
Analysis
Safety Goals
referenced in
specified for
support
verified by
integrated to
ensures 
referenced in
refined by 
realised by
derive
analysed by
realised by
System
derive
verify
SW 
Change 
Request
allocated to
allocated to
verified by
Technical SW 
Safety 
Requirements
SW 
Components
Software 
Architectural 
Design 
Software 
Architectural 
Design 
System Design 
Architecture
HW 
Components
Technical 
 HW Safety 
Requirements
requires
realised by
realised by
Safety Goals 
Contracts
analysed by
Development 
Team
New user story (if any) / confident estimation
Uncertain estimation
Game Planning (Release and Iteration)
implement user stories
 next iteration
Customer 
Approval
small releases
failed contracts (bugs) 
Analysis
Doing Done
Backlog 
Queue/Ready
Development
Doing Done
Test
Doing To Deploy DEPLOYED
support
support
Safety Case
Analysis
Planning
Implementaion
requirements (i.e., guarantees) and other related artefacts as well as GSN elements, safety 
contracts should be enriched with additional information. To this end, system developers 
should include additional information into the derived contracts as follows: 
1. Elements in the system architecture: all derived safety requirements should be allocated to 
elements of the system architecture. However, since the changes we are after in this work 
are non-structural, we assume that the changes have no effect on the system architecture. 
 
Figure 3— An illustration of a contract derivation by the Preliminary Process 
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2. Test cases: potential failure modes for which a safety requirement is derived should be 
considered as testing criteria during the verification phase to ensure the prevention of those 
failures. Including a reference to test cases in safety contracts enables direct traceability 
between safety analyses (i.e., FMEA and FTA), safety requirements (i.e., guarantees) and 
test cases. This traceability enables a top-down change impact analysis from the safety 
analysis down to the test cases. This top-down analysis represents the first direction of the 
tri-directional impact analysis process in our maintenance framework. While documenting 
the safety contracts, the reference of test cases might not be available as the test cases 
themselves might not be built yet. System developers are required to revisit each contract 
and add the corresponding test case references whenever they are made available. 
Furthermore, given that the test cases are available and complete, system developers can 
annotate them with the contracts’ references. The annotations in the source code of the test 
cases are important to establish a traceability that enables a bottom-up impact analysis 
from the test cases up to the safety analysis. This bottom-up analysis represents the second 
direction of the tri-directional impact analysis process in our maintenance framework.  
3. Elements of safety arguments: each safety contract should contain a reference to the 
related goals, contexts or items of evidence from safety arguments. Whenever GSN 
references are made available, system developers are required to revisit each contract and 
add the corresponding GSN reference to it. Including a reference to GSN elements in 
safety contracts enables direct traceability between a system and its safety case. This 
traceability enables a bi-directional impact analysis from the system to its safety case and 
vice versa. More clearly, an affected guarantee can lead to an affected GSN element. Since 
the safety case presents the logic of how different artefacts are related, impact analysts 
might use it to highlight the change impact in the related system. The bi-directional change 
impact analysis represents the third direction of the tri-directional impact analysis process 
in our framework. 
Figure 3 highlights the suggested traceability information and connects them to specimen 
artefacts and a GSN element. 
The Change Management Process 
In this section, we describe the second process of XP-Kan-Safe. This process and its activities 
represent the result of tailoring ASD and the V-model. The main objective of this tailored 
process is to guide whoever involved in the change management activities from the arrival of a 
change until the generation of a new test results report. Figure 4 presents the flow of these 
activities. The Change Management Process activities are described as follows: 
 
 Activity 1: Understand the change and its impact in the system and its safety case.   
Once a change request is placed, Activity 1 should be followed in which the safety engineers 
should understand the nature of the change and determine its potential effects in the system 
and its safety case. In order to initiate the Kanban management process, safety engineers 
should create a card that describes the change request in more technical specifications and 
visualise it as a WIP in the analysis phase. The outcome of this activity should provide 
plausible data about the impacted parts of the system and its safety case. 
 Figure 4— The change management process of XP-Kan-Safe framework 
 
Activity 2: Identify the impacted contracts. In this activity, all related safety 
contracts to the change should be identified. The benefit of applying the first process of XP-
Kan-Safe (i.e., preliminary) will be more realised in this activity since using safety contracts 
should help to provide a systematic impact analysis through the utilisation of the tri-
directional impact analysis. The identified contracts should be listed in the Kanban card. 
 Activity 3: Terminate: Forward the change request to the related team. If there is 
no safety contract identified as suspect in Activity 2, this implies that the change request has 
nothing to do with the functional safety in the system (no safety requirements are affected). In 
this specific case, the change request should be forwarded to the relevant team and no further 
continuation of the change management process is needed. 
 Activity 4: Investigate the impacted contracts to estimate the required size of 
work. There is no perfect impact analysis that can determine the effects of a change in the 
system and its artefacts at the first glance. That is, it is unlikely that the team will find out 
what might, precisely, get impacted merely by looking at the documented requirement and 
without iterating the impact analysis process. Hence, further investigation should be 
conducted to gain sufficient confidence in the perceived impact of a change. To this end, this 
activity should be followed to make further investigation of the impacted contracts. During 
this activity, a preliminary meeting should be carried out in which safety engineers, who 
represent the on-site customer with respect to XP, together with the development team, 
should determine the possibility of identifying more impacted contracts. Any additional 
identification of safety contracts should be added to the Kanban card. Safety contracts should 
support the collaboration between safety engineers and the development team to delimit the 
impacted parts of a system through the tri-directional impact analysis process. It is worth 
mentioning that any need to modify an existing contract or derive a new one will necessitate 
the application of this activity. 
 Activity 5: Derive new contracts or modify existing contracts. Since changes might 
introduce other changes, this might lead to modifying or deriving other contracts (i.e., 
requirements) that were not thought of earlier in Activity 2. In this activity, safety engineers 
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and system developers derive new contracts or modify the existing ones to capture the newly 
introduced requirements or to update the already captured requirements, respectively. An 
initial cost of the change accommodation and its timeframe are two among several other 
factors upon which the approval decision is made. The involvement of the development team 
in the Activities 4 and 5 should cover the estimation of the initial amount of work and the 
time needed to complete it. Safety engineers and system developers should agree on: 1) what 
should be changed or added (i.e., size of the work) and 2) the acceptance of the accompanied 
potential risk on safety functions. Subsequently, they should submit their agreement to the 
management where the latter can either decline or accept the change request. Submission of 
the agreement concludes the Analysis Phase, and this means that the Kanban card should 
move on the board from (Analysis → Doing) to (Analysis → Done). 
 Activity 6: Document the change and its rejection. If the change request receives a 
rejection by the management, the change request, the performed investigation and the 
management decision should be documented (ISO 26262:2011, 2011). The rejection implies 
that the Kanban card should be closed. 
 Activity 7: Plan the implementation of change. If the change request receives an 
approval by the management, the Kanban card should be available for development. The 
adopted planning method, in our change management process, complies with XP. This 
implies that the implementation of the change request is initiated by the planning game. The 
input of the planning game is the estimated work and the impacted safety contracts. The 
output are more fine-grained estimated tasks than the earlier estimated tasks in Activity 4. 
 Activity 8: Implementation by TDD. In this activity, the implementation of the 
change is carried out using TDD. For those contracts that are subject to modification, system 
developers should find the related test cases (using the parameters that refer to them in the 
contracts) and modify them accordingly. Since modifying a contract might require creating 
new test cases, system developers should cite the newly added test cases in the corresponding 
contracts and vice versa. This is particularly important to support bi-directional traceability 
between the test cases and the contracts while is deemed as a preparation for future changes. 
Citing the newly added test cases in the contracts applies to the derived contracts during the 
impact analysis process — after the preliminary process — as well Activity 5. Moreover, after 
implementing required production code to satisfy the derived test cases, other already existing 
test cases might get impacted by newly added code. If the solution is to modify or add new 
requirements, system developers should inform the safety engineers about the suggested 
changes to the requirements. In this case, the suggested changes by system developers should 
be declared as unexpected changes. Afterwards, safety engineers and system developers 
should arrange an on-the-fly meeting to investigate the discovered unexpected changes 
Activity 4. The meeting should reveal 1) whether or not the suggested changes might 
introduce unreasonable risks (i.e., criticality level) and 2) the size of work required to cope 
with the suggested changes. The size of work is defined, in this context, based on its influence 
on the earlier gaming plan Activity 7 so that big work means a modification of the release 
planning is required. If the suggested changes are non-critical, system developers should 
implement them or forward them to the relevant team. If the suggested changes are critical, 
one of two possible actions should be performed: 
1. If the size of work is small, developers should do the fixes on-the-fly and cite the related 
test cases in the contracts and vice versa. 
2. If the size of work is big and critical, developers should either follow the exchange 
strategy by XP to re-prioritise the tasks within the current iteration of the planned release 
or plan the tasks for the next release. 
 Activity 9: Run all related tests. In this activity, system developers should utilise the 
continuous integration as a first step, according to XP, to avoid delays caused by integration 
problems. Subsequently, a continuous testing process should be initiated to obtain immediate 
feedback on the possibility of violating safety countermeasures to prevent unreasonable risks 
associated with a software release. The scope of testing should be extended from a bottom-up 
assessment (from test cases to safety requirements) to validate safety goals. In case of any 
violation of safety requirements after running the continuous testing, system developers 
should follow Activity 8. 
 Activity 10: Generate new versions for the modified test reports. This activity 
should be followed once the continuous testing is completed successfully. New reports of the 
test results should be generated to replace the out-of-date reports in the safety case. It is 
significant to update the references of these reports in the safety contracts of the system and 
its safety case. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Maintaining safety critical systems due to changes is a challenging process because of: 1) the 
lack of awareness of the change’s effects and the ripple of these effects on the system, 2) the 
lack of documentation of dependencies among the generated artefacts during the development 
process, and 3) the lack of traceability between a system and its safety case. Following the V-
model to accommodate system changes might be very strict, which might be justifiable for 
structural system changes since many parts get impacted and there is no precise clue about the 
size of work needed to maintain the system. For software non-structural changes, this might 
not be justifiable. ASD can provide promising methods to maintain software changes. For 
example, XP puts great emphasis on the technical aspects (e.g., TDD, continuous integration 
and code refactoring). Also, Kanban brings the visibility of the workflow and improves the 
communication and collaboration among the stakeholders. Using ASD for maintaining safety 
critical systems can be promising but it still needs to comply with the current safety standards. 
In this paper, we introduced XP-Kan-Safe as a novel framework in which we tailor a hybrid 
process of ASD and the traditional V-model. The tailored process exploits safety contracts to 
connect ASD and the V-model, and enable a tri-directional impact analysis process. Future 
work will focus on creating a more in-depth case study to validate both the feasibility and 
efficacy of the process as well as to fully automate its application. 
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